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A Perspective on the Houston Economy
early 16 years have
elapsed since Houston’s oil bust
ended in early 1987. Since that
time several important events
have shaped the local business
cycle: the 1990–91 U.S. eco-
nomic recession, the U.S. eco-
nomic boom of the late 1990s,
the Asian financial crisis and
the 2001 U.S. recession. Inter-
woven with these larger events
is a related cycle in oil and other
commodities that was particu-
larly important to Houston.
Since 1987 Houston’s busi-
ness cycle has been marked by
rapid growth interspersed with
three distinct periods of no
growth or slow growth. The
most recent no-growth period
began in early 2001 and proba-
bly marks the city’s first reces-
sion since 1987.
The richest and most timely
set of data on the Houston
economy is 53 series of monthly
employment data by industrial
sector, and we use employment
as our primary guide to eco-
nomic activity since 1987. In
this article we look at total
employment, build a diffusion
index based on changes in
employment by sector and
search out unusual concentra-
tions of local jobs to define
local export activity. We also
use other economic series—
real retail sales, real wages and
the unemployment rate—to
define an index of coincident
economic activity. It is this
index that points to an ongoing
mild recession in Houston that
began in early 2001.
The 1991–93 Slowdown
The U.S. recession of the
early 1990s lasted from July
1990 to March 1991, but a pro-
longed period of weak expan-
sion and limited job growth 
followed. The jobless recovery
was not clearly over until mid-
1993, when the United States
entered an extended period of
rapid growth in both output
and employment. Even in the
early stages of this rapid growth
period—in 1993–94—the pat-
tern was set for 3 million new
jobs per year and 4 percent
annual GDP growth.
N
The Houston Business Cycle
Since the Oil Bust
Using Houston
employment as our
primary guide, we look
at total employment,
build a diffusion index
based on changes in
employment by sector
and search out unusual
concentrations of local
jobs to define local
export activity.
We also use other
economic series 
to define an index 
of coincident 
economic activity.Accompanying the U.S.
growth story was an important
cycle in oil and natural gas
exploration.
1 Two important oil
shocks preceded the national
recession. Crude oil prices
increased 50 percent as the
Iran–Iraq war ended in 1989
and OPEC found renewed dis-
cipline in world oil markets.
Then prices jumped another 
59 percent as Iraq invaded
Kuwait in 1990.
Local oil producers recog-
nized the transient nature of
the Gulf War oil spike but saw
the increased revenues and
cash flows as an opportunity 
to beef up staff and plant for 
a coming boom in natural 
gas-directed drilling. Conven-
tional wisdom held that the gas
bubble—the surplus of natural
gas generated by energy dereg-
ulation in the late 1980s—was
finally at an end and that gas
prices would soon rise sharply.
However, this expectation was
denied by a warm winter in
1990–91, when natural gas
prices plunged to near $1 per
thousand cubic feet. Domestic
drilling collapsed along with
gas prices, sending the number
of working rigs to the lowest
levels in the 50-year history of


















than doubled the tax on oil
and natural gas relative to other
energy forms, a potential blow
to refining and petrochemical
activity along the Ship Channel.
Proposed health care reform,
which introduced the term 
primary care physician, would
have struck hard at the special-
ized care offered by the Texas
Medical Center. Finally, a presi-
dential review of the need for a
space station project froze in-
vestment in the Clear Lake area.
Employment continued to
grow in Houston through much
of the 1990–91 U.S. recession;
oil revenues carried the local
economy, and job growth did
not flatten out until late 1990.
Even as the bad news mounted


















A Diffusion Index. Another
measure of employment strength
or weakness emphasizes the
breadth of change in employ-
ment as opposed to the total
number of workers with jobs.
The Texas Workforce Commis-
sion reports 53 separate em-
ployment series for Houston
each month, and a diffusion
index focuses on the number
of series increasing versus
those decreasing. Periods of
strong growth should see more
sectors increasing, and weak
growth would be accompanied
by a growing number of
declining sectors.
The diffusion index (It) for
time period t is calculated as
follows:
It = 37.75 + (Nt – Dt)
where Nt is the number of 
seasonally adjusted sectors
increasing from one month to
the next, Dt is the number de-
creasing and 12.25 is the aver-
age value of Nt – Dt from 1988
to 2002. Thus, the index is set
in such a way that its average
value from 1988 to 2002 is 50.
If the index is greater than 50,
the economy is performing
above average; if the index is
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Figure 1
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SOURCES: Baker Hughes; authors’ calculations.centration, the location quotient
is greater than 1; and if it has a
below average concentration,
the location quotient is less
than 1.
A location quotient greater
than 1 can be interpreted as
indicating potential specializa-
tion in production and export
activity from the community to
the rest of the nation and the
world. In Table 1, it is assumed
that 100 percent of oil produc-
ers, oil services and manufac-
turing is export-oriented. For
other sectors with a location
quotient greater than 1, the
excess share of employment—
the share above what would
normally be found in the com-
munity—is calculated as per-
cent export jobs in sector i =
















Table 1. While it
remains a good
measureo f Houston’s tradi-
tional economic base, one
could question whether the
measure has kept up with job
diversification trends in Hous-
ton, especially in the service
sector. Maybe the best way to
interpret these calculations is
as a timely measure of how
Houston’s traditional strengths
in oil, chemicals, engineering
and heavy construction are
performing. Again, focusing on
the 1992–93 period, Figure 4
clearly shows the serious dis-
tress felt by oil production,
drilling and related manufactur-
ing as the price of natural gas
collapsed.
What kept total employment
flat in Houston from 1991 to
1993, with so much downward
pressure on basic exports from
3
Figure 3
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SOURCES: Texas Workforce Commission; authors’ calculations.
Figure 3 plots a centered
seven-month moving average
of the index. It indicates the
same general periods of below-
average performance as total
employment, with values below
50 during 1991–93, 1998–99
and the current slowdown.
During the 1991–93 slowdown,
the index peaked in April 1990
at 61.3 and hit its low point in
October 1991 at 39.6.
Diffusion indexes often play
the role of leading indicators,
and this index played that role
well by turning before both the
slowing and the reacceleration
of job growth. Although total
employment began to grow
slowly in late 1992, this diffu-
sion index points up the slow-
ness of overall growth, indicat-
ing that the breadth of job
growth across sectors remained
below average through March
1995. It took strong U.S. eco-
nomic growth, which began 
in mid-1993, combined with a
1995 turnaround in oil and 
natural gas extraction to get
Houston’s employment growth
back on the fast track.
Defining Houston’s Export
Base. Another simple measure
of economic activity, also based
on employment data, is the ex-
port base of a locality. The cal-
culation begins with the concept
of excess employment and the
identification of unusual concen-
trations of workers in the local
economy. Such concentrations
may indicate export activity.
Table 1, for example, shows the
location quotients for a series
of key sectors in Houston.
percent share of total employment
LQi =
found in industry i in Houston
percent share of total employment
found in industry i in the United States
If Houston is a typical place
in the United States, its loca-
tion quotient is equal to 1; if it
has a higher than normal con-
Table 1
Location Quotients and Sector Share of Basic Employment in Houston, 2001
Sector Location quotient Percent basic
Oil producers 9.28 100
Oil services 6.54 100
Special trade contractors 1.21 17.4
Other construction 1.97 49.2
Manufacturing .76 100
Electricity, gas, sanitary services 2.38 26.2
Durable wholesale 1.31 23.8
Personal services 1.09 8.6
Business services 1.18 15.1
Auto repair 1.13 11.5
Legal services 1.17 14.2
Engineering, management services 1.6 37.5
NOTE:Oil producers, oil services and manufacturing sectors are 100 percent basic by assumption; other sectors follow
formula in text.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.the oil sector? Basic exports are
important because they pay for
imports; Houston trades oil
services for financial services
from New York, autos from
Detroit and software from Silicon
Valley. Exports also support
inherently local, nonexport
activities such as dry cleaners,
video rental stores, grocery
stores, drugstores and neigh-
borhood restaurants. After a
solid recovery and expansion
following the oil bust (total
employment grew 3.4 percent
per year from January 1987 to
January 1992), nonexport activ-
ities also grew rapidly, lagging
the basic industries and trying
to catch up with the earlier
rapid export growth. This con-
tinued momentum from non-
basic growth, plus additional
help from the U.S. economy
after 1991, provided just enough
strength to keep job growth
out of a significant decline in
1992–93.
The 1998–99 Slowdown
During 1996 and 1997,
Houston’s economy hit on all
cylinders and ran at peak
capacity.
2 The national economy
was booming, along with drill-
ing activity and oil services, and
there was strong capital spend-


















Indonesia, the Philippines and
South Korea. The roots of the
crisis lay in too much capital
seeking too few deals in the
fastest growing part of the
world, a loss of confidence in
these countries’ banking sys-
tems and a collapse of local
currencies as foreign capital
fled the region. Eventually,
countries throughout Asia, Latin
America and Eastern Europe
felt the destabilizing effects of
the crisis, and the world saw
the worst collapse of commodity
prices—for cotton, soybeans,
copper, gold and especially oil
—since the Great Depression.
Oil markets in 1998 were
already headed for a difficult
year. A warm winter and spring,
ongoing humanitarian sales of
Iraqi crude oil, and OPEC’s
decision to increase quotas and
ratify cheating by its members
all added crude oil to world
markets. Then the Asian crisis
added another 400,000 barrels
per day, and the price collapsed
to $10–$12 per barrel at mid-
year. Cheap Middle Eastern
chemicals that would have been
sold to Asia were diverted to
Europe and other U.S. export
markets. Planned engineering
and industrial construction
projects were canceled around
the globe.
Crude oil prices fell to $12
per barrel in June 1998, and
domestic drilling followed to a
seasonally adjusted 525 rigs in
April 1999, yet another all-time
low. Foreign drilling was simi-
larly depressed. Oil prices did
not improve until OPEC and
several non-OPEC producers
forged an agreement in March
1999 to remove 2 million bar-
rels of crude from world mar-
kets. By May 1999, West Texas
Intermediate had improved
from $12 to $19 per barrel, and
natural gas had risen from
$1.64 to $2.20 per thousand
cubic feet.
Throughout the crisis, U.S.
growth was shaped by two
conflicting trends. One was the
slowdown in world growth and
the collapse of commodity
prices. The other was a sharp
decline in short- and long-term
interest rates, as the 30-year
bond fell from 6.5 percent in
July 1997 to dip briefly under 
5 percent in October 1998.
Lower rates, rising incomes 
and stock market gains fueled
demand for autos, housing and
durable goods. By the second
half of 1998, the United States
seemed to have shrugged off
any global problems and re-
turned to its fast-growth track
of the late 1990s.
The mix of good news and
bad—depressed commodity
markets versus strong U.S.
growth—shows up clearly in
our charts for the 1998–1999
period. Each shows a different
part of the story. Figure 2
shows no prolonged decline in
employment, for example, as
job growth simply flattens out
for the first six months of 1999.
In contrast, Figure 3 shows a
prolonged period of weakness.
The breadth of employment
growth peaks in December
1997 at 61.3 and falls under 
4
Figure 4
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.50 in July 1998. It would not
be until April 2000 that the 
diffusion index would move
above 50 and stay there. With
both commodity markets and
the U.S. economy struggling,
fewer and fewer local sectors
were left growing.
The depth of the problems
in oil and other commodity
markets is best illustrated by the
number of jobs in Houston’s
export base (Figure 4). Basic
export employment fell 4.9
percent between December
1998 and October 1999. The
peak in base employment came
late—18 months after the Asian
financial crisis began and 10
months after domestic drilling
peaked.
How did Houston avoid 
losing jobs in 1998–99? The
answer again lies in a combina-
tion of strong continued U.S.
growth and past momentum.
Figure 5 contrasts the behavior
of basic and nonbasic Houston
employment, measured monthly
by average annual growth rates.
The rapid growth in 1996–98
created a need for continued
growth in local businesses such
as dry cleaners and retail stores,
local construction, housing and
such, providing momentum
that carried over into 1998–99
even as Houston’s traditional
export base was collapsing.
The result was nonbasic em-
ployment growth that stayed
well above 2 percent annually,
while oil and chemical jobs
collapsed.
The Current Slowdown
The primary force affecting
the U.S. economy since early
2001 has been the recession
and the jobless recovery.
4 Rapid
U.S. expansion ended in 2000
as rising interest rates began to
choke off housing, auto and


















ued weakness in the New Econ-
omy, and concerns about war
and terrorism have combined to
prevent any significant job
growth in either Houston or the
United States in 2002.
Crude oil and natural gas
prices have been surprisingly
strong since 2000. Oil prices
moved over $30 per barrel in
the spring of 2000 on the heels
of an agreement among OPEC
and non-OPEC producers,
including Russia, Norway and
Mexico. A target band of
$22–$28 was set for a basket
of OPEC crude oils, and OPEC
discipline has since kept crude
prices mostly within the price
band. Natural gas prices have
also provided positive sur-
prises, generally staying above
$2 per thousand cubic feet
since 1996. Despite warm win-
ters in 1998–99 and 2001–02,
falling industrial demand
throughout the 2001 recession
and record-high natural gas in-
ventories, gas prices have typi-
cally defied gravity and remained
above $2—often far above.
Given strong energy prices,
the mystery is why oil field
activity has remained subdued.
Domestic drilling began to
decline from a seasonally
adjusted peak of 1,281 rigs in
April 2001 and fell by 39.8 per-
cent to 771 by the following
March. The rig count climbed
to 850 by May and stayed near
that level through the rest of
2002. Driven by oil instead of
natural gas, international
drilling never collapsed like
domestic exploration and has
remained relatively healthy. Oil
field conditions have not been
nearly as bad as in previous oil
cycles of the 1990s, but oil
service companies are frus-
trated that energy prices have
been so high and drilling activ-
ity so weak. Producers seem to
have focused more intently on
the fundamentals of recession,
warm weather and high inven-
tories than on price alone.
Total employment in Hous-
ton peaked at 2,125,000 jobs 
in April 2001 and declined by
15,000 jobs, or 0.7 percent, 
by year-end. 2002 saw very lit-
tle change in total employment.
The diffusion index (Figure 3)
peaked in August 2000 and
slipped under 50 in March
2001. Since that time, the index
has remained in the low 40s,
thus far providing no indication
of coming recovery.
The export-base employ-






















SOURCES: Texas Workforce Commission; authors’ calculations.peaked again in May 2001 at a
level that exceeded the prior
December 1998 peak by less
than 1 percent. The number 
of export base jobs has since
declined by a relatively mild 
2 percent. Nonbasic activity has
been affected by the prolonged
period of no significant growth
in basic jobs and by the con-
tinued lack of stimulus from
the U.S. economy. Nonbasic
employment has averaged
annual growth rates of only 
0.1 percent in 2001–02. There
has been no source of positive
stimulus in Houston through-
out 2002.
Was It a Recession?
Throughout the previous
discussion and analysis, we have
been careful to describe job
growth over the last 16 years
as slowing, turning flat or de-
clining slightly. The emphasis
on a single variable—employ-
ment—makes it difficult to talk
about recession or a broad
decline in the macro economy.
Different variables—unemploy-
ment, personal income or retail
sales, for example—might lead
to different conclusions about
the direction, timing or depth
of a particular cyclical event.
On the other hand, as the
cyclical event occurs, there
















ures of macroeconomic activity,
giving them equal weight after
adjusting for volatility: personal
income (less transfer payments),
nonfarm employment, indus-
trial production, and sales by
trade and manufacturing. In
recent years, a new and very
different approach has emerged
to measure the business cycle,
a dynamic single-factor model
of coincident economic activity
created by Stock and Watson.
5
The Stock and Watson
approach uses broad measures
of economic activity to estimate
a single unobserved, underly-
ing variable consistent with the
general notion of a business
cycle. The underlying variables
chosen for Houston are non-
farm employment, the unem-
ployment rate, real wages and
real retail sales. Based on their
correlation over time, we define
a coincident index as a measure
of the business cycle.
6
All four of the selected vari-
ables are statistically significant
factors in defining the Houston
business cycle and carry the
expected signs. Employment is
restricted to entering the equa-
tion with no lags, but other
variables can enter with lags if 
statistically significant. Employ-
ment, real wages and real retail
sales enter the equation simul-
taneously, while the unemploy-
ment rate enters simultaneously
and with a single lag.
We first estimated the model
from January 1980 through
March 2002, the period for
which all variables are available.
We then updated it through
October 2002 using data only
on employment and the unem-
ployment rate. The model is
highly stable, and the size of
the Houston economy provides
a smooth series.
The weights selected by 
the model emphasize nonfarm
employment (.48) and real
wages (.33) as the key variables,
while smaller but significant
information comes from the
unemployment rate (.11) and
retail sales (.08). The coinci-
dent index for Houston, based
on July 1992 = 100, is shown 
in Figure 6. The index looks
very much like a smoothed
version of total employment in
Figure 2, but it now contains
much more information about
the Houston business cycle. 
Timing and duration of cyclical
events differ slightly between
the two series.
Was there a recession in the
1990s? The index in the 1991–93
period is flat, indicating that
Houston skirted recession for 
a prolonged period but never
suffered a significant reverse.
The business cycle does not
show a decline that could be
labeled a recession. The story
is similar for 1998–99; again
employment was flat with no
significant decline, but for a
much shorter period than
1991–93.
The current slowdown,
however, does show a decline
beginning in May 2001, although
it amounted to only 1 percent
by December of that year.
There was no significant im-
provement throughout 2002
that would indicate recovery.
6
Figure 6
Coincident Economic Activity Index for Houston, 1988–2002
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.Thus, after twice avoiding the
label, the current downturn
marks Houston’s first recession
since the 1980s. Houston Busi-
ness will revisit the question 
of whether economic recovery
may be under way later this
spring, after the employment
data for 2002 are rebench-
marked.
Is the recession mild? Com-
pare the 1 percent decline in
2001 with Houston’s double-
dip, oil-bust recession of the
1980s—a recession built on
massive speculation in oil and
real estate. The same coincident
index tells us that between
March 1982 and November
1983 the Houston economy
declined by 12 percent; be-
tween November 1984 and Jan-
uary 1987 it fell another 10.1
percent. Houston may have
found speculative excesses in
2001 in energy trading and
downtown office space, for
example, but the impact so far
on the overall economy has
been relatively mild.
Conclusion
Strong growth in Houston
in the 1990s required more
than oil; it needed both a
growing U.S. economy and
strong oil markets. When both
factors were working, the
Houston economy performed
in stellar fashion. But weakness
from either side quickly showed
up in both the rate and breadth
of total employment growth.
Weakness in both the U.S. econ-
omy and oil markets essentially
stopped the Houston economy
in its tracks in 1991–93 and
1998–99, and in 2001 it led
Houston into its first minor
recession since the oil bust.
This 1990s pattern of no
growth or very mild recession
contrasts sharply with the huge
economic setbacks that followed
oil and real estate overspecula-
tion in the 1980s. Although still
a commodity-driven economy
with roughly half of its jobs
directly or indirectly dependent
on oil, natural gas and petro-
chemicals, Houston’s business
cycle has been substantially
tamed since the 1980s.
— Robert W. Gilmer
Iram Siddik
Iram Siddik is a student at 
Rice University.
Notes
1 For a description of Houston’s economy
during this period, see the following
issues of Houston Business: “Houston
in 1993,” February 1993; “Houston’s
Slowdown: National Recession or Oil
Patch Slump?” August 1993; and “Hous-
ton’s Economy: Still Slow in 1994?”
December 1993.
2 See the following issues of Houston
Business: “Houston Again Shares State’s
Economic Growth,” August 1995;
“Houston Economy Shows Endurance
and Renewed Strength,” October 1996;
and “Houston Economy Heats Up,”
August 1997.
3 See these issues of Houston Business:
“Asian Flu and Oil Glut Weaken Out-
look for Houston,” March 1998; and
“Weak Commodity Prices Take Toll on
Gulf Coast Economy,” March 1999.
4 For details on this period, see the fol-
lowing issues of Houston Business:
“The Wheel Turns Again: Lessons from
the Latest Oil Cycle,” June 2000; “Gulf
Coast Expansion Waits for Upstream,
Downstream Energy,” April 2002; and
“Houston’s Near-Term Outlook: Slow
Growth, Downward Risk,” October
2002.
5 James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson
(1989), “New Indexes of Coincident
and Leading Economic Indicators,”
NBER Macroeconomic Annual, ed.
Olivier J. Blanchard and Stanley
Fischer (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
for National Bureau of Economic
Research), 351–94.
6 Alan Clayton-Matthews and James H.
Stock (1998–99) build an index for the
state of Massachusetts based on the
income tax base, sales tax base and
unemployment rate in “An Application
of the Stock/Watson Index Methodology
to the Massachusetts Economy,”
Journal of Economic and Social Meas-
urement 25: 183–233. The variables
chosen for this index are the same as
those used in an unpublished paper,
by Keith Phillips and Jesus Cañas of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,
that examines the business cycle of
Texas border cities. The authors would
like to thank Phillips for suggesting the
model for Houston and Cañas for esti-
mating it.
7Responding primarily to cold
weather in the Midwest and
Northeast, natural gas prices
climbed from $3.80 per thousand
cubic feet to more than $5 by
mid-December. A record surplus
quickly evaporated, pulling in-
ventories to 17 percent below
last year and 5 percent below the
five-year average. Gas supplies
remain adequate for a normal
winter, but continued arctic
weather could push prices even
higher. 
Improved energy market
fundamentals have not trans-
lated into increased domestic
drilling; a rise in workover
activity (a quick route to a pro-
duction boost) and a jump in
Texas drilling (mostly inexpen-
sive gas projects) were the only
responses. Total U.S. activity
remained near 850 working rigs,
the same level observed since
last May. International activity
has improved over the past two
months, led by the North Sea
and Latin America, but the gen-
eral strike in Venezuela could
reverse these recent gains. 
Petrochemicals and Refining
Growth in petrochemical
demand decelerated sharply at
midyear, matching the slow-
down in the rest of the indus-
trial sector. Through year-end,
there is still no indication of
improved demand, prices are
stable or declining, and the
higher oil and gas feedstock
prices are coming out of profit
HoustonBeigeBook December 2002
ouston shows few signs
of emerging from the mild re-
cession it entered early in 2001.
Employment remains flat; the
seasonally adjusted unemploy-
ment rate has continued to rise
all year and now stands near 6
percent; and the local Purchas-
ing Managers Index shows no
forward momentum in energy or
manufacturing. A sluggish U.S.
economy and lackluster drilling
have conspired to keep the
Houston economy in the dol-
drums.
Retail and Auto Sales
For retailers, the holiday
problem was not a shortage of
customers. It was deep discount-
ing, widespread promotions
and fierce competition. Shop-
pers responded by filling the
stores and walking away with
retailers’ profits, making the
consumer the holiday winner.
Fortunately, retailers entered
the holiday season with light
inventories and had little trouble
clearing out seasonal goods. 
Auto sales continue weak
despite ongoing dealer incen-
tives and promotions. November
sales for Harris County were 
off 3 percent from 2001 and are
down 8 percent year-to-date. 
Energy Prices and Drilling
Oil and natural gas prices
have risen sharply in recent
weeks. Crude oil prices have
been driven by a variety of fac-
tors: cold weather, OPEC’s
decision to rein in production,
the threat of war in Iraq and
a general strike in Venezuela.
The price of West Texas Inter-
mediate rose from $25 per
barrel in mid-November to
$32 by late December.
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margins. Overcapacity remains
a significant problem in key
areas such as ethylene.
Refining margins improved
through mid-December as cold
weather drove heating oil prices
up faster than the price of crude.
Since mid-December, the Vene-
zuelan general strike has pushed
prices up sharply, and several
important Gulf Coast refineries
could find themselves out of
crude by early January if ship-
ments don’t resume. High levels
of oil product imports from
Europe delayed a price response
to potential gasoline and heat-
ing oil shortages, but gasoline
pump prices were rising quickly
by late December. 
Residential Real Estate
November new home sales
were up 2 percent compared
with a year earlier, traffic was
up 14 percent and housing
starts rose 29 percent. Inventory
is rebuilding from last year’s
lows and now stands 41 percent
higher than a year ago. Novem-
ber sales of existing homes,
propelled by low interest rates,
matched last year’s high levels.
Apartment leasing activity is
sluggish; low interest rates and
strong single-family sales are
pulling people out of apart-
ments, and slow job growth is
providing few replacement ten-
ants. Rents are flat across all
classes of units, with occupancy
strong at the bottom of the
market and weak at the top.